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How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer
Отличная (очень длинная) статья в IEEE Spectrum о причинах двух последних авиакатастроф: "How the Boeing 737 Max Disaster Looks to a Software Developer" - https://spectrum.ieee.org/aerospace/aviation/how-the-boeing-737-max-disaster-looks-to-a-software-developer
Неправильно вырывать цитаты из контекста, но вот некоторые (MCAS - программная система, которую Боингу пришлось внедрить для корректировки проблем с потерей управляемости, вызванных установкой новых больших двигателей, призванных удешевить перелёты):
"Boeing’s solution to its hardware problem was software."
"It all comes down to money, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and its customers to keep the money flowing in the right direction."
"In the MCAS system, the flight management computer is blind to any other evidence that it is wrong, including what the pilot sees with his own eyes and what he does when he desperately tries to pull back on the robotic control columns that are biting him, and his passengers, to death."
"It is astounding that no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 Max seems even to have raised the possibility of using multiple inputs, including the opposite angle-of-attack sensor, in the computer’s determination of an impending stall. As a lifetime member of the software development fraternity, I don’t know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to this mistake."
"Today, safety doesn’t come first—money comes first, and safety’s only utility in that regard is in helping to keep the money coming."
"It is likely that MCAS, originally added in the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have ever saved."
Неправильно вырывать цитаты из контекста, но вот некоторые (MCAS - программная система, которую Боингу пришлось внедрить для корректировки проблем с потерей управляемости, вызванных установкой новых больших двигателей, призванных удешевить перелёты):
"Boeing’s solution to its hardware problem was software."
"It all comes down to money, and in this case, MCAS was the way for both Boeing and its customers to keep the money flowing in the right direction."
"In the MCAS system, the flight management computer is blind to any other evidence that it is wrong, including what the pilot sees with his own eyes and what he does when he desperately tries to pull back on the robotic control columns that are biting him, and his passengers, to death."
"It is astounding that no one who wrote the MCAS software for the 737 Max seems even to have raised the possibility of using multiple inputs, including the opposite angle-of-attack sensor, in the computer’s determination of an impending stall. As a lifetime member of the software development fraternity, I don’t know what toxic combination of inexperience, hubris, or lack of cultural understanding led to this mistake."
"Today, safety doesn’t come first—money comes first, and safety’s only utility in that regard is in helping to keep the money coming."
"It is likely that MCAS, originally added in the spirit of increasing safety, has now killed more people than it could have ever saved."